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Abstract
Many data producers seek to provide users access to confidential data without unduly
compromising data subjects’ privacy and confidentiality. One general strategy is to require
users to do analyses without seeing the confidential data; for example, analysts only get
access to synthetic data or query systems that provide disclosure-protected outputs of sta-
tistical models. With synthetic data or redacted outputs, the analyst never really knows
how much to trust the resulting findings. In particular, if the user did the same analysis on
the confidential data, would regression coefficients of interest be statistically significant or
not? We present algorithms for assessing this question that satisfy differential privacy. We
describe conditions under which the algorithms should give accurate answers about statis-
tical significance. We illustrate the properties of the proposed methods using artificial and
genuine data.
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1 Introduction
In many settings, data producers such as national statistical agencies, survey organizations,
health systems, and private sector companies—henceforth all called agencies—seek to provide
researchers and the broader public access to data on individual records. However, these agencies
are ethically and often legally obligated to protect the confidentiality of data subjects’ identities
and sensitive attributes. Research has shown that stripping obvious identifiers, like names and
addresses, may not suffice to protect confidentiality (e.g., Sweeney, 1997, 2013; Narayanan and
Shmatikov, 2008; Parry and Chase, 2011). Ill-intentioned users—henceforth called intruders—
may be able to learn sensitive information by linking released data files to records in external
databases by matching on fields common to both datasets, thereby breaking the protection from
de-identification.
In recognition of this threat, agencies have developed and deployed techniques that allow
users to do analyses without seeing the actual data. One approach is to use remote access query
systems (Gomatam et al., 2005) in which the user submits a query to a server that holds the data
for output from some statistical model. The server runs the query and reports back the analysis
results to the user, e.g., estimated regression coefficients and their standard errors, without ever
allowing the user to see the individual-level data. To further reduce disclosure risks, the outputs
usually are coarsened or perturbed (O’Keefe and Chipperfield, 2013); for example, the server
can add noise to outputs that satisfies the risk criterion differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006;
Wasserman and Zhou, 2010). Query system approaches are used by many government agencies,
such as the Census Bureau and the Australian Bureau of Statistics, and are being implemented
for general social science data access, for example in DataVerse (King, 2007; Crosas, 2011)
and in the Private data Sharing Interface (Gaboardi et al., 2016a). A second approach is to
release fully synthetic data (Rubin, 1993; Raghunathan et al., 2003; Reiter, 2005; Drechsler,
2011). Here, the agency generates new values for every confidential datum by sampling from a
predictive distribution estimated with the confidential data. Since all values are simulated, it is
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nonsensical for intruders to match released cases to external records. Synthetic data have been
used in several public use data products, including the Longitudinal Business Database (Kinney
et al., 2011), the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Abowd et al., 2006), and the
OnTheMap application (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008).
While query systems and synthetic data are appealing options for data release, they have
a significant drawback: it is difficult for analysts to know how much they should trust the
results of their analyses. For example, in a query system, the user might ask for outputs from
a regression model that, in actuality, fits poorly on the confidential data. This lack of fit cannot
be easily detected from the coefficients and standard errors alone, whether they are perturbed
or not. Additionally, the steps taken to perturb the outputs could infuse substantial error into
the reported coefficients. Similar dilemmas arise for synthetic data. By default, the synthetic
data reflect only those distributional features and relationships encoded in the synthesis models
(Reiter, 2005). The synthesis models may fail to describe the data in ways that lead the analyst
to findings that are not supported by the confidential data. Further, even when the synthesis
models adequately describe the distributions in the confidential data, the process of generating
synthetic data tends to increase standard errors, which could obscure important relationships.
The literature on privacy-preserving data analysis has begun to address aspects of this prob-
lem. Reiter (2003) suggests that linear regression output from query systems be accompanied
by synthetic plots of residuals versus predicted values. Related residual diagnostics for logistic
regressions are proposed in Reiter and Kohnen (2005) and O’Keefe and Good (2009). Chen
et al. (2016) present an algorithm for releasing residual plots (and also an algorithm for ROC
curves for logistic regression) that satisfies differential privacy. Their algorithm takes as input
the privately-estimated coefficients, which could come from noisy outputs or a synthetic data
analysis. While useful diagnostic tools, these plots do not provide analysts with means to com-
pare inferences obtained via the privacy-preserving mechanism to those that would be obtained
from the confidential data. It may be, for example, that a particular regression coefficient of
substantive interest has a large p-value in the noisy output or synthetic data, even though it has
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a small one in the confidential data, or vice versa.
In this article, we present algorithms for comparing the sign and significance level of privately-
computed regression coefficients, i.e., those computed via output perturbation or via synthetic
data, with those computed from the confidential data. We envision the outputs of these algo-
rithms being delivered to users via a verification server (Reiter et al., 2009). This is a query
system that allows users to ask for measures indicating how similar privately-computed results
are to those based on the confidential data without allowing users to see the confidential data.
The algorithms satisfy differential privacy, which has important benefits in this interactive con-
text. As shown in Reiter et al. (2009) and McClure and Reiter (2012), when verification servers
provide exact (unperturbed) answers to queries about similarity of results, intruders can query
the server repeatedly to gather information that, in combination, provides unacceptably tight
ranges for individual confidential values. Differential privacy provides provable bounds for the
amount of information leaked by the server over repeated queries, regardless of their nature.
The basic idea of the algorithms is built on the subsample and aggregate mechanism of Nis-
sim et al. (2007). We randomly partition the confidential data into M disjoint subsets. In each
subset, we estimate the regression using only the data in that subset, from which we compute
the univariate t-statistic for the regression coefficient(s) of interest to the user. We truncate each
t-statistic at some user-defined threshold a; this facilitates differentially private algorithm de-
sign, as we discuss later. We add noise to the average of the truncated t-statistics, sampled from
a Laplace distribution with variance tuned to satisfy differential privacy. We refer the resulting
noisy statistic to an appropriate reference distribution under the null hypothesis that the coeffi-
cient equals zero, resulting in calibrated p-values. The p-value can be used directly as evidence
of the significance of the coefficient, or it can be compared with the corresponding, privately-
computed p-value for purposes of verification. The sign of the noisy t-statistic also provides a
differentially private estimate of the sign of the coefficient.
We are not aware of algorithms for differentially private significance tests for linear regres-
sion coefficients, although the literature on differential privacy includes significance tests for
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models appropriate for other settings. Several authors have developed differentially private
significance tests for categorical data and contingency tables (e.g., Vu and Slavkovic, 2009;
Gaboardi et al., 2016b; Wang et al., 2017). These tests cannot be sensibly used for linear re-
gression, where the outcome variable, as well as potentially some of the explanatory variables,
are assumed to be continuous rather than categorical. Solea (2014) and D’Orazio et al. (2015)
propose differentially private significance tests for the mean and the difference of means of
Gaussian random variables, respectively. These authors assume that bounds for the means or
the data values are known, whereas we work in multivariate regression settings where bounds
on the variables need not be known. Campbell et al. (2018) propose a differentially private
algorithm for analysis of variance, which is a special case of linear regression with only cate-
gorical explanatory variables. They restrict results to outcomes that lie on the unit interval, do
not consider continuous predictors, and report only the result of the omnibus significance test
that all coefficients simultaneously equal zero. Karwa and Vadhan (2017, 2018) propose differ-
entially private algorithms to obtain confidence intervals for single means of Gaussian random
variables, which can be inverted to significance tests. Their approach relies on spending some
privacy budget to bound the range and standard deviation of the data values for the single vari-
able. Their approach does not apply in a straightforward manner to regression modeling with
multiple explanatory variables, as the expression for the variance of any estimated regression
coefficient has a numerator and denominator that are non-linear functions of all the variables
used in the regression model.
Multiple authors have developed differentially private algorithms for estimating pieces of the
outputs needed for significance testing of coefficients in linear regressions or other predictive
models (e.g., Sarlo´s, 2006; Chaudhuri and Monteleoni, 2009; Dwork and Lei, 2009; Chaudhuri
et al., 2011; Kifer et al., 2012; Zhang et al., 2012; Bassily et al., 2014; Karwa et al., 2015; Wu
et al., 2015; Honkela et al., 2016; Jing et al., 2018). None of these works includes procedures
to compute standard errors, making it impossible to conduct significance tests. Sheffet (2015)
presents an algorithm for estimating regressions that does provide standard errors and hence
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significance tests; however, the algorithm sometimes returns output associated with a variant
of ridge regression rather than strictly linear regression. The algorithm also requires all data
values to be bounded, which we do not require in our algorithms. Finally, the algorithm appears
to require (, δ > 0)-differential privacy to give useful outputs, whereas our algorithm allows
for -differential privacy,
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review differential
privacy and some of the techniques used to design algorithms that satisfy it. In Section 3, we
present the algorithm for the differentially private t-statistic, including its reference distribu-
tion. In Section 4, we discuss some theoretical aspects of the differentially private t-statistic,
focusing on approximation properties and type II error rates. In Section 5, we present results
of simulation studies that illustrate the performance of the differentially private t-statistic in
finite samples. In Section 6, we present an approach for choosing the number of partitions and
the threshold level. These drive the accuracy and usefulness of the inferences. In Section 7,
we conclude with suggestions for implementation of these techniques, as well as discuss future
research topics around verification of privately-computed regression quantities.
2 Review of Differential Privacy
Before reviewing differential privacy, we motivate why one should not simply release verifica-
tion measures without redaction. Suppose that an intruder asks a verification server to return
the value of the t-statistic for the slope in a regression of an outcome y on a single predictor
x, and that the verification server provides this value from the regression estimated with the
confidential data. Consider a worst case scenario: the intruder knows the values of (xi, yi) for
all but one record in the confidential data. If the intruder submits a regression involving all
records and then requests the t-statistic, the user can try various combinations of (x, y) for that
unknown record until finding the set of values that yield the reported t-statistic. More generally,
similar attacks work for an intruder who knows the values of (xi, yi) for any r records in the
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confidential data when the intruder can request output from a regression estimated with those r
records plus one additional record.
As these examples illustrate, it is desirable to redact the verification measures before releas-
ing them, which we do using differential privacy. Let A be an algorithm that takes as input a
database D and outputs some quantity o, i.e., A(D) = o. In our context, these outputs are used
to form verification measures for the t-statistic and sign. Define neighboring databases, D and
D′, as databases that differ in one row and are identical for all other rows. Specifically, D and
D′ are neighboring databases if there exists only one record d ∈ D and one record d′ ∈ D′ such
that d 6= d′ and D− {d} = D′ − {d′}.
Definition 1 (-differential privacy). An algorithm A satisfies -differential privacy if for any
pair of neighboring databases (D,D′), and any non-negligible measurable set S ⊆ range(A),
the Pr(A(D) ∈ S) ≤ exp()Pr(A(D′) ∈ S).
Intuitively, A satisfies -DP when the distributions of its outputs are similar for any two
neighboring databases, where similarity is defined by the factor exp(). The , also known as
the privacy budget, controls the degree of the privacy offered by A, with lower values implying
greater privacy guarantees. -DP is a strong criterion, since even an intruder who has access to
all ofD except any one row learns little fromA(D) about the values in that unknown row when
 is small.
Differential privacy has three other properties that are appealing for verification measures.
Let A1(·) and A2(·) be 1-DP and 2-DP algorithms. First, for any database D, releasing the
outputs of both A1(D) and A2(D) ensures (1 + 2)-DP. Thus, we can quantify and track the
total privacy leakage from releasing verification measures. Second, releasing the outputs of both
A1(D1) and A2(D2), where D1 ∩D2 = ∅, satisfies max{1, 2}-DP. Third, for any algorithm
A3(·), releasing A3(A1(D)) for any D still ensures 1-DP. Thus, post-processing the output of
-DP algorithms does not incur extra loss of privacy.
A common method for ensuring -DP is the Laplace Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006). For
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any function f : D → Rd, let ∆(f) = max(D1,D2) ||f(D1) − f(D2)||1, where (D1,D2) are
neighboring databases. This quantity, known as the global sensitivity of f , is the maximum L1
distance of the outputs of the function f between any two neighboring databases. The Laplace
Mechanism is
LM(D) = f(D) + η, (1)
where η is a d × 1 vector of independent draws from a Laplace distribution with density p(x |
λ) = (1/(2λ)) exp(−|x|/λ), where λ = ∆(f)/. We use the Laplace Mechanism to design
verification measures that satisfy -differential privacy, which we refer to as -DP verification
measures.
We also use the subsample and aggregate technique (Nissim et al., 2007). This technique al-
lows us to reduce the global sensitivity of f , thereby reducing the variance in the noise distribu-
tion. To implement this technique, we randomly partition the datasetD intoM disjoint subsets,
D1, . . . ,DM . We then compute f(D1), . . . , f(DM) and their average M−1
∑M
l=1 f(Dl). The
global sensitivity of M−1
∑M
l=1 f(Dl) is 1/M times that of f(D), since any single observation
appears in at most one of the partitions. Finally, we use the Laplace mechanism to release a
noisy version of M−1
∑M
l=1 f(Dl).
3 The Differentially Private Test Statistic
We begin by laying out relevant notation and formally specifying our objectives. Let D be a
confidential dataset comprising n individuals. For each individual i = 1, . . . , n, let yi ∈ R
be its univariate response variable and xi = (1, xi,1, . . . , xi,p)> ∈ Rp+1 be its (p + 1) × 1
vector of predictors. Hence, D = {(xi, yi)}ni=1. An analyst seeks to estimate the parameters
in the regression, yi = β>xi + ei, where β = (β0, . . . , βp)> ∈ Rp+1 and ei are i.i.d. random
errors with E(ei) = 0 and V ar(ei) = σ2. In linear regression, we typically assume that
ei ∼ N(0, σ2) for all i, although our algorithm can be used with other error distributions. We
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assume that, if the analyst had direct access to D, he or she would make inferences about
each βj based on the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE), βˆj , and its corresponding sampling
distribution. However, the analyst does not get direct access toD; instead, the analyst can learn
only the privately-computed estimates β˜j , which could arise from perturbed versions of βˆj or
from synthetic data. Our key question is whether or not inferences about βj are similar when
using βˆj or β˜j .
To address this question, we develop differentially private significance tests. Let T (D) be
the standardized estimator of βj obtained fromD, that is,
T (D) = βˆj/
√
Σˆj,j,
where
(
Σˆj,j
)
is the (j, j)th element of the matrix, Σˆ = σˆ2(X>DXD)
−1. Here, σˆ2 = (yD −
βˆ
>
XD)
>(yD−βˆ>XD)/(n−p−1), where yD = (y1, . . . , yn)>, andXD = [x>1 , . . . , x>n ]> is the
design matrix associated with the regression when estimated with D. Under certain conditions
onXD, βˆj is asymptotically normally distributed for a large range of error distributions (Van der
Vaart, 2000, page 21; Bhattacharya et al., 2016, section 6.8). The key condition on the design is
that the maximum among the diagonal elements of the matrix XD(X>DXD)
−1X>D goes to zero
as n→∞. Hence, for a large enough n, the distribution of T (D) can be suitably approximated
by a standard Gaussian distribution. In the remainder of the article, we refer to T (D) simply as
the t-statistic.
T (D) provides all the information needed for inferences about the sign and significance of
βj . Hence, we can address our key question and account for privacy by developing algorithms
for releasing differentially private versions of T (D), along with deriving reference distributions
for the private t-statistics. Taken together, these algorithms enable the analyst to assess the
significance level for βj directly from the private output.
Unfortunately, we cannot simply apply the Laplace mechanism in (1) to create the differen-
tially private test statistic, as the global sensitivity of T (D) is unbounded. A possible remedy is
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to work with some bounded statistic instead of T (D). For statistical significance, two obvious
candidates include (i) the p-value associated with T (D) and (ii) a truncated version of T (D).
We next describe some of the pros and cons of each approach.
Let pT be the p-value associated with T (D) for a two-tailed significance test of the null
hypothesis βj = 0. Any pT has global sensitivity equal to one. Let pT, be the -differentially
private p-value obtained after adding Laplace noise to pT based on the global sensitivity of one.
With high probability, adding this noise to small values of pT could inflate them so much as
to change our opinion of the significance of βj . This is less problematic when adding noise
to large values of pT . In other words, for a given , the probability that an analyst reaches the
same decisions about statistical significance when using pT, or pT is higher when pT falls in an
acceptance region for H0 than when pT falls in a rejection region.
Regarding the second approach, let the truncated t-statistic be given by
T t(D) =

−a if T (D) < −a,
T (D) if − a ≤ T (D) ≤ a,
a if T (D) > a,
(2)
where a > 0 is a user-defined parameter. Here, a has to be large enough to ensure that T (D) and
T t(D) lead to the same conclusion regarding the null hypothesis with high probability. Because
of the truncation, the global sensitivity of T t(D) equals 2a. Let T t,(D) = T t(D) + η be a
noisy version of T t(D), where η ∼ Lap(0, 2a/) and Lap(l, s) denotes the Laplace distribution
with location l and scale s. The problematic situations for T t,(D) are the reverse of those for
pT . With undesirably high probability, adding noise to values of T t(D) near zero could make
an insignificant effect appear significant, whereas the noise is not likely to change our opinion
about significance when T (D) is large. Put another way, for a given , the probability that an
analyst reaches the same decisions about statistical significance when using T t,(D) or T t(D)
is higher when T t(D) falls in a rejection region for H0 than when T t(D) falls in an acceptance
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region.
The arguments above suggest that neither approach always outperforms the other. We opt
for the second approach because T t(D) is more analytically tractable than pT . As a result, we
find it easier to develop a properly calibrated significance test, and understand its theoretical
properties, for T t(D) than for pT . Using T t(D) also allows the release of a noisy estimate of
the sign of βj without additional expenditure of , which improves the overall utility of the data
release without sacrificing privacy.
Since the length of the range of T t(D) coincides with its global sensitivity, we need to use a
large  to ensure that T t,(D) is practically useful, perhaps larger than what we would like from
the perspective of protecting privacy. Put another way, for a small  the noise introduced by the
Laplace mechanism may be so large compared to T t(D) that the statistic has little ability to
detect any deviations from the null hypothesis. Hence, we need to adapt the truncated t-statistic
to reduce the global sensitivity.
We consider a way to do so based on the subsample and aggregate method described in
Section 2. We first randomly partitionD intoM disjoint subsets, P = {D1, . . . ,DM}, of equal
size (or as close to equal as possible when n/M is not an integer). In each Dl, we estimate the
regression model of interest using only Dl. For the regression coefficient of interest, we then
compute the set of M t-statistics, {T (D1), . . . , T (DM)}, and truncate each T (Dl) at [−a, a],
akin to (2). Let {T t(D1), . . . , T t(DM)} be the set ofM truncated t-statistics. We then compute
T¯ t(P) =
M∑
l=1
T t(Dl)/M.
The sensitivity of T¯ t(P) is 1/M times the sensitivity of T t(D), which apparently achieves our
goal. However, we do not create the differentially private measure by adding Laplace noise to
T¯ t(P), for reasons we now describe.
Because of the random partitioning, it is reasonable to consider eachDl as a random sample
from a population (with infinite sample size) and, thus, each T t(Dl) as a random draw from
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Algorithm 1
Input:
D: dataset {(xi, yi)}ni=1 M : number of subgroups
a: truncation level : privacy parameter
j: indicates the regression coefficient for which the algorithm is
computed
Output: t1: noisy value of T¯
t, at P
Choose a random partition P = {D1, . . . ,DM} of D;
for l←− 1 . . .M do
zl =

−a if T (Dl) < −a,
T (Dl) if − a ≤ T (Dl) ≤ a,
a if T (Dl) > a,
end
Generate η from Laplace
(
0, 2a

√
M
)
t1 := M
−1/2∑M
l=1 zl + η
Algorithm 2
Input:
t1: noisy value of T¯
t, at P M : number of subgroups
a: truncation level : privacy parameter
N : size of the Monte-Carlo simulation
Output: p.value: p-value associated with t1
for k ←− 1 . . . N do
i) Draw z1, . . . , zm from N(0, 1)
ii) for l←− 1 . . .M do
ztl =

−a if zl < −a,
zl if − a ≤ zl ≤ a,
a if zl > a,
end
iv) Generate η from Laplace
(
0, 2a

√
M
)
v) sk = M
−1/2∑M
l=1 z
t
l + η
end
p.value = proportion of sk such that |sk| > |t1|
Figure 1: Differentially private algorithms for T¯ t,. Algorithm 1 shows the steps to release
values of T¯ t,, for a given (M,a, ). Algorithm 2 shows how to compute the p-value associated
with the released t-statistics of Algorithm 1.
its sampling distribution. We would like the sampling distributions of T t(D) and T¯ t(P) to be
approximately the same, so that the significance test based on T¯ t(P) would have approximately
the same power function as that based on T t(D). When this is the case, analysts should have
high probability of reaching similar conclusions when using the adapted t-statistic or T t(D).
However, the variance of T¯ t(P) is roughly M times smaller than the variance of T t(D). Thus,
instead of using T¯ t(P) directly, we equate the variances by multiplying T¯ t(P) by √M ; that is,
we use T¯ t,R(P) = √MT¯ t(P). This changes the global sensitivity, as it increases from 2a/M
to 2a/
√
M . Hence, the differentially private version of the t-statistic is T¯ t,(P) = T¯ t,R(P) + η,
where η ∼ Lap(0, 2a/√M).
Figure 1 displays the steps that agencies can use to release T¯ t,(P) (Algorithm 1). The figure
also describes simple Monte Carlo algorithms that can be used to approximate the sampling
distribution of T¯ t,(P) (Algorithm 2). This reference distribution can be used to obtain approx-
imate p-values corresponding to the test statistic. The Monte Carlo simulations are needed to
properly account for all sources of randomness, including the noise from the Laplace Mech-
anism. Taken together, Algorithm 1 and 2 provide a means to perform differentially private
significance tests. Inferences about the sign of βj can be obtained from the sign of T¯ t,(P).
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Finally, we conclude this section with a formal theorem and proof that Algorithm 1 is differ-
entially private.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. T¯ t,R has global sensitivity equal to 2a/
√
M . Hence, defining T¯ t,(P) = T¯ t,R(P) +
Lap(2a/
√
M) implies that, by Definition 1, Algorithm 1 satisfies -differential privacy.
4 Theoretical Properties
In this section, we discuss some of the theoretical properties of T¯ t,(P). First, we derive condi-
tions that characterize the distance between T¯ t,(P) and T (D). We then study the asymptotic
probability of type II errors for the statistical test defined from T¯ t,(P).
4.1 Distance between T¯ t,(P) and T (D)
To characterize the distance between T¯ t,(P) and T (D), we focus on the probability
P
{∣∣T¯ t,(P)− T (D)∣∣ > c|XD,R} for all c > 0, where R denotes the random mechanism
used to partition D and to create P . We note that D and P are functions of (yD,XD) and
(yD,XD,R), respectively. Since we are conditioning on XD andR, the randomness in T (D)
and T¯ t,(P) comes from treating yD as a random variable. We use the triangle inequality to
bound this probability and, in this way, focus on characterizing each of the terms defining the
right hand-side of
P
{∣∣T¯ t,(P)− T (D)∣∣ > c|XD,R} ≤ P {∣∣T¯ t,(P)− T¯ t,R(P)∣∣ > c|XD,R}
+ P
{∣∣∣√MT¯ (P)− T (D)∣∣∣ > c|XD,R}
+ P
{∣∣∣T¯ t,R(P)−√MT¯ (P)∣∣∣ > c|XD,R} , (3)
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where T¯ (P) = M−1∑Ml=1 T (Dl). The first term is relatively straightforward to understand
theoretically and corresponds to computing a probability under the Laplace distribution. Thus,
P
{∣∣T¯ t,(P)− T¯ t,R(P)∣∣ > c|XD,R} = exp(−c√M
2a
)
. (4)
As expected, the bound in (4) indicates that T¯ t,(P) gets closer to T¯ t,R(P) as the scale of the
underlying Laplace distribution, 2a/
√
M , goes to zero, that is, as M and  increase and a
decreases.
Turning to the second term in (3), we now provide conditions that ensure
√
MT¯ (P) is a
reasonable approximation of T (D). To begin, we treat eachDl as an independent sample from
an infinite population. We make inferences conditional on each XDl . Throughout, we rely on
the following assumption.
Assumption A1. The distribution of βˆjl, i.e., the MLE of βj estimated with Dl treating XDl
as fixed, can be suitably approximated by a Gaussian distribution with mean βj and variance
Σj,j(Dl), where Σj,j(Dl) denotes the jth diagonal element of Σ(Dl) = σ2(XTDlXDl)
−1 and
XDl is the design matrix associated withDl.
A1 is widely assumed in practice in regression modeling (see Van der Vaart, 2000, page 21;
Bhattacharya et al., 2016, section 6.8). Under A1, treating each Dl as independent samples
and conditioning on XDl implies that
√
MT¯ (P) and T (D) are both Gaussian-distributed with
variance equal to one. However, it is not necessarily the case that the means of each T (Dl) are
equal just because the conditional means of each βˆjl are equal, nor that these means equal the
mean of T (D). In particular, when βj 6= 0, T (Dl) is based on a smaller sample size and a dif-
ferent design matrix than T (D), which results in different (typically smaller) expected values.
Thus, we need to derive conditions on the means of each
√
MT (Dl), where l = 1, . . . ,M , that
guarantee the mean of
√
MT¯ (P) is close to the mean of T (D).
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Since eachDl in actuality is a random sample fromD, as long as the sample size in each par-
tition is large it is reasonable to assume that (X>DlXDl) ≈ (X>DkXDk) for all pairs of datasets
(l, k). Moreover, it also is reasonable to make the following assumption.
Assumption A2. M(X>DlXDl) ≈ (X>DXD) for all l = 1, . . . ,M .
With A2, we have M−1Σ(Dl) ≈ Σ(D). Using this approximation, we take expectations of
√
MT¯ (P) conditional on the realized (XD,R). We have
E
{√
MT¯ (P)|XD,R
}
= M−1
M∑
l=1
E
{√
MT (Dl)|XD,R
}
= M−1
M∑
l=1
√
Mβj/
√
Σj,j(Dl)
≈ M−1
M∑
l=1
βj/
√
Σj,j(D) = E {T (D)|XD} . (5)
Additionally, using the approximation in A2, for anyDl the
Cov
{
(X>DXD)
−1X>DyD, (X
>
Dl
XDl)
−1X>DlyDl | XD,R
}
= σ2(X>DXD)
−1 = Σ(D).
Therefore, we have
Cov
{
T (D),
√
MT¯ (P)
∣∣∣XD,R} = √M
M
M∑
l=1
Cov {T (D), T (Dl)|XD,R}
=
1
M
M∑
l=1
√
Σj,j(D)√
M−1Σj,j(Dl)
> 0. (6)
Thus, the smaller the distance is betweenX>DXD andM(X
>
Dl
XDl), the higher is the correlation
between
√
MT¯ (P) and T (D).
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A direct application of the Markov inequality implies that
c2P
{∣∣∣√MT¯ (P)− T (D)∣∣∣ > c|XD,R} ≤
V ar
{√
MT¯ (P)|XD,R
}
+ V ar {T (D)|XD,R} − 2Cov
{
T (D),
√
MT¯ (P)
∣∣∣XD,R}
+
[
E {T (D)|XD,R} − E
{√
MT¯ (P)
∣∣∣XD,R}]2 . (7)
Thus, under A2, by A1 and (5) we have
V ar
{√
MT¯ (P)|XD,R
}
≈ V ar {T (D)|XD,R} ≈ 1
and
E {T (D)|XD,R} ≈ E
{√
MT¯ (P)
∣∣∣XD,R} .
By (6), we have
Cov
{
T (D),
√
MT¯ (P)
∣∣∣XD,R} ≈ 1.
Therefore, the probability in (7) is near zero, implying that the distance between
√
MT¯ (P) and
T (D) has high probability of being small.
Finally, we provide an upper bound for the last term in (3). This bound allows us to under-
stand how choices of M and a affect the distance between
√
MT¯ (P) and T¯ t,R(P). Specifically,
it follows that
P
{∣∣∣√MT¯ (P)− T¯ t,R(P)∣∣∣ > c|XD,R} ≤ P {∣∣∣√MT¯ (P)− T¯ t,R(P)∣∣∣ > 0|XD,R}
= 1− P
{√
MT¯ (P) = T¯ t,R(P)|XD,R
}
≤ 1−
M∏
l=1
P
{
T (Dl) = T
t(Dl)|XD,R
}
= 1− (Φ (a− µ)− Φ (−a− µ))M , (8)
where µ = E{T (Dl)|XDl ,R} and Φ denotes the cumulative distribution function of the stan-
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dard Gaussian distribution. The probability in (8) reveals that T¯ t,R(P) gets closer to√MT¯ (P)
as a increases and M decreases. Together, (4)–(8) provide a full characterization of (3).
4.2 Asymptotic power properties of T¯ t,(P)
We next study the type II error rates for the significance test defined from T¯ t,(P). For given
values of (M,a, ), and under H0 : βj = 0 (i.e., µ = 0), let r be a positive constant such that
PH0
{|T¯ t,(P)| < r |XD,R} = 1− α,
where PH0 denotes the probability computed underH0. Here, r corresponds to the critical value
that ensures a significance level of α for the test Tt,(P) = I(−r,r)(T¯ t,(P)), where IB(b) = 1 if
b ∈ B and IB(b) = 0 otherwise. Thus, the type II error probability associated with this test is
given by EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R}, where EH1 denotes expectation under H1 : βj 6= 0.
The strategy used to define T¯ t,(P) makes it difficult to derive analytical expressions for r and
EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} in terms of (α,M, a, ). However, since T¯ t,(P) is a function of random
variables that are easy to generate numerically, it is trivial to use Monte Carlo simulation to
provide accurate approximations of r and EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R}. This allows us assess type II
error rates for the test both asymptotically, which we study in this section, and in finite samples,
which we study in Section 5.
As n goes to infinity, T¯ t,R(P) converges in probability to √Ma. Hence, the asymptotic
probability of type II error is approximately equal to the probability of the acceptance region
(−r, r) under a Laplace distribution with location and scale equal to √Ma and 2a/√M, re-
spectively. This characterization immediately reveals that the probability of type II error for this
test never equals zero.
Figure 2 displays a Monte Carlo approximation of the asymptotic probability of type II error
associated with the test Tt,(P) for different values of (α, a,M, ). For most of the combina-
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tions of (α,M, a, ) studied here, it is possible to obtain an asymptotic probability of type II
error that is close to zero, with (α = 0.01,  = 0.1) being the lone exception. For any given
(α,M, ), the asymptotic probability of type II error is almost constant as a function of a, that
is, limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} decreases at a slow rate as a increases. The type II error
probabilities also decrease as any one of M , α, or  increases, holding the others constant. We
note that analysts can use this Monte Carlo approach to approximate the asymptotic probability
of type II error for any combination of (α,M, a, ). Thus, for example, for a fixed (α, ), an-
alysts can determine values of (M,a) that lead to a specified asymptotic probability of type II
error. For example, for α = 0.05,  = 1, and limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} < 0.001, we find
that M needs to be greater than 25 provided that a is greater than one.
Although the Monte Carlo approach provides accurate and straightforward approximations,
it is also instructive to characterize the asymptotic behavior of EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} math-
ematically under arbitrary choices of (α, a,M, ). Theorem 2 provides an upper bound for
limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R}. Analogous to Figure 2, in the supplementary material we
present a graphical representation of the upper bound. We observe that (9) is a sharp bound
when a > 2. For 1 ≤ a ≤ 2 and some values of M , the bound in (9) is a moderately less
precise, but still valid, bound for limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R}. The proof of Theorem 2 is in
the supplementary material.
Theorem 2. Under H1 : βj 6= 0 and assumption A1,
lim
n→∞
E {Tt, |XD,P } < I{r∗<√Ma}
1
2
(
α−1−
√
M/2a − α1+
√
M/2a
)
exp
(
−M
2
)
+ I{r∗>√Ma}
(
1− 1
2
α1+
√
M/2a
[
exp
(
M
2
)
− exp
(
−M
2
)])
,(9)
where r∗ = −log(α)
(
2a/
√
M + 1
)
.
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Figure 2: Asymptotic probability of type II error associated with the test Tt,(P) for dif-
ferent values of (α, a,M, ). Each asymptotic probability is computed using Monte Carlo
approximation based on 10,000 realizations of Tt,(P). Within any panel and combina-
tion (M,a), black represents limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} = 1 and white represents
limn→∞EH1 {Tt,(P) |XD,R} = 0, with lighter grays as the loss function approaches 0.
5 Empirical Illustrations
The results in Section 4.1 suggest we should make a as large as possible and M as small as
possible to ensure the proximity between T¯ t,R(P) and T (D). However, the accuracy of the
approximation of T (D) is only part of the story. We need to add Laplace noise to protect
privacy. To maximize the usefulness of the privately-computed t-statistic T¯ t,(P), we seek to
add as little noise as possible while still satisfying differential privacy. This pushes us to make
a smaller rather than larger, and to make M larger rather than smaller. How do we trade off
accuracy in T¯ t,R(P) for reductions in variance of the Laplace noise? We have a partial answer
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this question from the asymptotic results in Section 4.2, but, in practice, we have to analyze
finite samples. Which choices of (M,a) tend to offer higher accuracy for a given risk level 
with finite samples?
In this section, we address this question using simulation studies. In all simulations, we
assume that βˆj ∼ N(βj,Σj,j(D)) and βˆj,l ∼ N(βj,Σj,j(Dl)) for any j and l, i.e., we as-
sume that A1 holds. We consider two scenarios, one where MX>DlXDl ≈ (X>DXD), where
l = 1, . . . ,M , i.e., where A2 holds, and the other where this is not necessarily the case. The
scenarios are generated as follows.
In Scenario I, we work directly with the theoretical distributions of the t-statistics, without
simulating and partitioning values of D. For an arbitrary regression coefficient β, let µT be
the number of standard deviations that its value is from zero. We consider multiple values of
µT in the simulation. For any µT , we generate T and T¯ t,R from their sampling distributions as
follows,
T ∼ N(µT , 1)
T¯ t,R =
1
M
M∑
l=1
√
M
(−aI(−∞,−a)(Zl) + ZlI[−a,a](Zl) + aI(a,∞)(Zl)) . (10)
We let Zl
i.i.d.∼ N(√MµT , 1). We use the Laplace mechanism based on the appropriate global
sensitivity values to generate T¯ t,.
Each T and T¯ t,R is generated independently. Generally, one would expect their values to
be positively correlated when computed on some D. However, generating them independently
guarantees that A2 holds. Scenario I provides lower bounds for cases where the t-statistics are
positively correlated, since the statistics should be more similar when positively correlated than
when independent.
In Scenario II, we work with a subset of the March 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS)
public use file comprising n = 49, 436 heads of households with non-negative incomes. This
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dataset was used by Reiter (2005) and Chen et al. (2016), among others. In order to use realistic
predictor distributions, we set XD to be an n× 25 matrix of values derived from the CPS data.
Its columns include age in years, age squared, education (16 levels), marital status (7 levels),
and sex (2 levels). We generate multiple sets of the response variable Y from linear regressions
on XD, each using a different, pre-specified set of β = (β0, . . . , β24)>, so as to control the
importance of the regression coefficients. For j = 0, . . . , 24, let Σj,j(D) be the jth diagonal
element of σ2(X>DXD)
−1, where σ = 0.82. This value of σ corresponds to the residual standard
error of a linear regression fitted using the logarithm of income—one of the variables in the CPS
data—as the response variable and XD as predictors. To derive any one β = (β0, . . . , β24)>,
we set each βj = µT
√
Σj,j(D) for some specified number of standard deviations µT from zero.
Using this β, we simulate realizations of T and T¯ t,R via the following steps.
i) For i = 1, . . . , n, generate yi from N(x>i β, σ
2), where xi denotes the ith row-vector of
XD and σ = 0.82.
ii) SetD = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, and generate a random partition P = {Dl}Ml=1.
iii) Get a realization of T = T (D) by computing the t-statistic of the jth regression coeffi-
cient estimated fromD.
iv) For l = 1, . . . ,M , set Zl = T (Dl) as the t-statistic of the jth regression coefficient
obtained from the regression of y on XDl . Get realizations of T¯
t,R from (10).
We then add Laplace noise to generate T¯ t,.
For both scenarios, we let µT ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1, 2, . . . , 10}, let M ∈ {10, 25, 50, 75, 100}, let
a ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, and let  ∈ {0.5, 1, 2.5, 5}. We generate simulations for all possible combina-
tions of (µT ,M, a, ). For each combination (µT ,M, a, ), we generate 100,000 realizations of
(T, T¯ t,R) for Scenario I and 1,000 realizations for Scenario II.
We evaluate the significance tests based on T¯ t, by comparing the power at each value of
µT to the power of the test based on T at each corresponding value of µT . We evaluate the
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properties of the differentially private sign measures by comparing how often one can infer the
correct sign of each βj from the corresponding T and T¯ t,. We also compute the probability that
a user makes the same decision about the significance level or sign when using T and T¯ t,; we
call these matching probabilities.
5.1 Assessing inferences about significance
We study the significance properties of the t-statistics using the following quantities,
p0(t, γ) = P {|T | < t |µT = γ,XD } ,
pt,(t, γ,M, a, ) = P
{|T¯ t,| < t |µT = γ,M, a, ,XD,R} .
As a slight abuse of notation, we condition these probabilities on (γ,M, a, ) to highlight that
they parametrize the probabilities.
For a given significance level α and type II error rate λ0, let r0 and q0 be positive constants
such that p0(r0, 0) = 1−α and p0(r0, q0) = λ0. Notice that r0 is the (1−α/2)th quantile of the
distribution of T when µT = 0, i.e., r0 is the critical value under the null hypothesisH0 : βj = 0
that ensures a confidence level of 1−α for the test T = I(−r0,r0)(T ). The value q0 is the number
of standard deviations from zero at which the test T reaches the desired Type II error λ0, i.e.,
under H1 : βj = q0
√
Σj,j(D), the power of this test is equal to 1− λ0.
Let r and λ(M,a, ) be positive constants such that pt,(r, 0,M, a, ) = 1−α and λ(M,a, ) =
pt,(r, q0,M, a, ). For given values of (M,a, ), r is the critical value under H0 that ensures a
confidence level of 1 − α for the test Tt, = I(−r,r)(T¯ t,). The value λ(M,a, ) corresponds to
the type II error rate of Tt, under H1 : βj = q0
√
Σj,j(D).
To assess how similar the test Tt, is to T, we use the loss function,
Lsigt, (M,a, ) = max(0, λ(M,a, )− λ0).
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For a given significance level α, we say there is zero loss of power from using Tt, when the
type II error rate of Tt, at q0 is less than λ0. Otherwise, we record the corresponding loss of
power, λ(M,a, )− λ0. For all results in this subsection, we set α = 0.05 and λ0 = 0.2.
We begin by examining the values of Lsigt, (M,a, ) at the different combinations of (M,a)
when  = ∞, i.e., no noise is added to T¯ t,. To save space, we present these results in the
supplementary material. In Scenario I, the power for Tt, and T are almost identical for a ≥ 2
for all values of M . This finding conforms with the theory in Section 4. The results with the
CPS data in Scenario II follow a similar pattern except for M = 100. This is expected since
large values of M weaken the validity of A2.
We next consider  < ∞, as needed to satisfy differential privacy. Figure 3 displays values
of Lsigt, (M,a, ) for  ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.5, 5.0}. In Scenario I, Lsigt, (M,a, ) tends to be smaller
when M is large and a is small, and largest when M is small and a is large. In other words, the
discrepancy between the power of Tt, and T is smaller when the global sensitivity is smallest.
For values of  > 1, there is at least one combination of (M,a) for Tt, that provides almost
no loss in power. For  = 1, with Tt, we need M ≥ 50 and a ∈ {1, 2} to experience only
a small power loss. For  = 0.5, with Tt, we still can achieve only modest power losses by
using (M ≥ 75, a = 1). As expected, the power of Tt, is strongly influenced by . As  gets
smaller, so does the power. The reduction in power for small values of  is the price to pay for
strengthening the privacy guarantee. However, we emphasize that Tt, is still a valid test when
 is small, in that it gives the correct type I error rates regardless of the value of . Finally,
the result patterns obtained under Scenario II generally match those obtained under Scenario I
except for M = 100. For this value of M , we notice a loss of power for some of the regression
coefficients. We attribute this discrepancy to the fact that large values of M weaken the validity
of A2.
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5.2 Assessing inferences about signs of coefficients
Since the sign of µT and βj is the same, we restrict our analysis to the sign of µT only. Because
the Laplace and Student-t distributions are symmetric, we only consider the case where µT ≥ 0.
We study the sign of the statistics using the following quantities,
s0(γ) = P {sign(T ) = sign(µT ) |µT = γ,XD } ,
st,(γ,M, a, ) = P
{
sign
(
T¯ t,
)
= sign(µT ) |µT = γ,M, a, ,XD,R
}
.
These represent probabilities that the t-statistics have the same sign as βj when the value of βj
is γ standard deviations from zero. For a given probability α0, let µ0 be a positive constant such
that s0(µ0) = α0, i.e., µ0 is the number of standard deviations at which T (D) has the same sign
of βj with a probability equal to α0. To assess how similar α0 is to st,(µ0,M, a, ), we use the
loss function
Lsgnt, (M,a, ) = max(0, α0 − st,(µ0,M, a, )).
We say that T¯ t, and T (D) result in similar inferences about the sign of βj when
α0 > st,(µ0,M, a, ). For all results in this subsection, we set α0 = 0.95.
We again begin with the values of Lsgnt, (M,a, ) for  = ∞; results are displayed in the
supplementary material. Across scenarios, inferences about the sign of βj based on T¯ t,=∞ are
quite accurate for all combinations of (M,a). Figure 4 displays results for Lsgnt, (M,a, ) when
 ∈ {0.5, 1.0, 2.5, 5.0}. In general, when  ≤ 2.5, T¯ t, offers many combinations of (M,a) that
result in accurate inferences about the sign of βj , especially when a is small and M is large.
We also find combinations of (M,a) that result in accurate inferences about the sign even when
 = 0.5, in particular when M ≥ 50 and a ∈ {1, 2}. When  = 5, the results for T¯ t, are
practically indistinguishable for almost all combinations of (M,a). These general findings hold
for both scenarios, so that T¯ t, provides a differentially private mechanism to release the sign of
βj that seems robust against violations of A2.
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5.3 Matching probabilities
We define matching probabilities as the probability that sign(T ) = sign(T¯ t,) and the probabil-
ity that Tt, = T. We assess these probabilities using the quantities,
msigt, (µT , ) = min
M,a
P {Tt, = T|µT ,M, a, ,XD,R} ,
msgnt, (µT , ) = min
M,a
P
{
sign(T ) = sign(T¯ t,)|µT ,M, a, ,XD,R
}
,
where each minimum is over all possible combinations of M ∈ {10, 25, 50, 75, 100} and
a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}. As we minimize over (M,a), these metrics represent the worst case match-
ing probabilities for these simulations. In the supplementary material, we present analogous
figures showing the maximum values of the matching probabilities, which represent the best
case matching probabilities for these simulations.
Figure 5 displays the values of msigt, (µT , ) for different values of µT and . The results in
Scenario I and II follow similar patterns so we describe them simultaneously. Under the null
hypothesis, i.e., µT = 0, values of m
sig
t, are greater than 0.85. When µT is large enough, values
of msigt, are close to one. The value of µT at which m
sig
t, is close to one is inversely related to
the value of . For example, when  = 5 and µT > 5, then m
sig
t, ≈ 1. However, when  = 0.5,
msigt, < 0.5 for all values of µT . Values of m
sig
t, tend to be small when µT ∈ [r0, r], where r0
and r are the critical values associated with T and Tt,, respectively. Because r increases as 
decreases, the range of values of µT where m
sig
t, is small becomes wider as  decreases.
Figure 5 also summarizes the results for msgnt, (µT , ). As expected, in both scenarios, in-
creases in µT correspond to increases in the matching probability. The rate at which m
sgn
t,
increases as a function of µT depends on : the larger the , the faster the rate. In both scenar-
ios, we observe a high matching probability (msgnt, > 0.9) when µT ≥ 3 and  ≥ 2.5. When
µT < 3, m
sgn
t, ranges from 0.5 to 0.9 for almost all . It reaches a minimum value when µT = 0,
regardless of the value of ; however, when µT = 0, matching the sign of T and T¯ t, arguably is
25
not important for interpretations.
6 Choosing M and a Without Additional Privacy Loss
To use these differentially private test statistics, the data producer or, when permitted in a veri-
fication server, the analyst first fixes the desired privacy level  and then must select values for
M and a. Here, we consider an analyst who does not get to choose  but does get to choose
(M,a). Analysts who get to choose , e.g., when allocating a total privacy budget across multi-
ple queries, could repeat the approach described here with different values of .
In this section, we present a three step approach for selecting values of (M,a) that does
not incur additional privacy loss. We illustrate these steps with a regression analysis of the CPS
data, using the sameXD as before and the reported values of household income on a logarithmic
scale as the response variable. This regression fits reasonably well without obvious violations
of the assumption of i.i.d. Gaussian errors. We present the methodology for T¯ t, with  = 1.5.
The three-step approach also can be used for the sign.
Step 1: Fix an upper bound for Lsigt, (M,a, ). To begin, the user specifies an upper bound
for Lsigt, (M,a, ) for their desired significance level α and type II error rate λ0. By fixing α and
λ0, it is implied that there exists q0 > 0 such that the power of T equals (1− λ0) when βj is q0
standard deviations from zero. Thus, the bound for Lsigt, (M,a, ) represents the loss of power
that a user is willing to accept by using T¯ t, instead of using T when βj is q0 standard deviations
from zero. In our illustrative example, we set α = 0.05 and λ0 = 0.2, and fix an upper bound
of 0.1.
Step 2: Simulate values of Lsigt, (M,a, ) for choices of M and a. The user can simulate
values of Lsigt, (M,a, ) for different combinations of (M,a) using the strategy described in
Scenario I of Section 5. As an example, Table 1 displays the values of Lsigt, (M,a, ) for different
combinations of (M,a). Of course, this table is not comprehensive; users can create different
tables with different combinations of (M,a). Importantly, we do not compute the entries in
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M
a 10 25 50 75 100
1 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 0.17 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.01
4 0.51 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.04
5 0.65 0.34 0.16 0.10 0.07
6 0.74 0.47 0.25 0.16 0.12
7 0.79 0.58 0.34 0.22 0.16
8 0.82 0.66 0.43 0.30 0.21
9 0.84 0.72 0.51 0.37 0.27
10 0.86 0.77 0.59 0.44 0.34
Table 1: Theoretical values of Lsgnt, (M,a, 1.5) at different combinations of (a,M), α = 0.05,
and λ0 = 0.2. Values in bold satisfy the condition L
sgn
t, (M,a, 1.5) < 0.10.
Table 1 using the CPS data; otherwise, the results would leak information about the confidential
data. When auxiliary data are available, such as synthetic data, analysts could base the tables
off these auxiliary data using the strategy described in Scenario II of Section 5.
Step 3: Choose (M,a). The user considers all values of (M,a) corresponding to values of
Lsigt, (M,a, ) below the fixed upper bound. When no combination of (M,a) satisfies this condi-
tion, the user has to sacrifice accuracy and increase their error tolerance. Once possible solutions
exist, we recommend that the user choose the smallest value ofM from these solutions. Smaller
values of M result in larger sample sizes within the partitions, lessening the possibility that A1
or A2 are invalid. In our example, based on Table 1, the user should choose the smallest values
of M for which Lsigt, (M,a,  = 1.5) is below 0.1, which is M = 25. The user then chooses the
value of a that minimizes Lsigt, (M = 25, a,  = 1.5). From Table 1, L
sig
t, (M = 25, a,  = 1.5)
reaches its minimum at 0.05 for Tt, and a ∈ {1, 2}. In theory, any of these values of a should
work. In this case, we recommend a = 2 since this truncation level has the least effect on the
approximation to T (D).
We now illustrate this method of choosing (M,a) on the CPS data. Using (M = 25, a = 2),
we compute the differentially private p-value and sign using Algorithms 1 and 2; results for all
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25 coefficients are displayed in the supplementary material. The p-values from the differen-
tially private significance test and the test based on the confidential data D agree substantially,
resulting in essentially the same conclusions about the significance for most of the regression
coefficients. We observe discrepancies when the p-values based on D provide weak evidence
against the null. Regarding the sign, the outputs from the differentially private algorithm agree
with the observed signs for almost all coefficients, except some with large p-values. When p-
values for the test of H0 : βj = 0 are quite large, changes in sign arguably are inconsequential.
As an additional illustration, we repeat the model selection and estimation using  = 0.5 and
upper bound for Lsigt, (M,a, ) equal to 0.2; detailed results are in the supplementary material.
The (M,a) selection algorithm suggests that we set (M = 100, a = 1). For estimating the
signs, the differentially private algorithms continue to be effective: the privately-computed and
observed signs systematically agree on all but three of the coefficients with significant p-values.
For p-values, we see different interpretations of the significance for 3 out of 25 coefficients.
We conjecture why this occurs when discussing the results in the supplementary material. Of
course, interpretations about the quality of the results for different (M,a) and  are data-specific,
and we expect lower reductions in data quality forD with larger sample size.
7 Concluding Remarks
The methods described here allow data producers to provide -differentially private answers to
queries about the statistical significance and signs of coefficients in linear regression models.
Further, the strategy from Section 6 provides users with a principled way to choose (M,a). We
expect that these methods can be applied to significance testing with other regression models.
The key assumptions are A1 and A2, which are reasonable for many models and data settings.
The methods extend trivially to two contexts that are not discussed in previous sections.
First, we can test general null hypotheses, H0 : βj = b with b ∈ R. We simply define the
t-statistic as (βˆj − b)/
√
Σˆj,j , and apply the algorithms without modification. One application
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of this extension, which we leave to future investigation, is to set b equal to the output of a
privately computed regression coefficient β˜j . The test statistic then could be interpreted as a
noisy, truncated estimate of the number of standard errors β˜j is from βˆj . Second, we can test
the significance of the intercept, i.e., H0 : β0 = b. This is equivalent to a -DP, one sample t-test
for a single mean. Unlike other tests for means, this significance test does not presume known
bounds on data values or population means. Nonetheless, it would be interesting to compare
the power of the various tests for single means to see when each offers the best performance.
The algorithm described here provides results for one βj at a time. If analysts are given a
finite privacy budget, they must spend part of that budget for each coefficient they wish to verify.
Thus, a key area for research is to develop differentially private algorithms that allow queries
for multiple test statistics without burning through the privacy budget too quickly.
Supplementary Material
The online supplementary materials include a graphical representation of the upper bound pro-
vided in Theorem 2, and the proof of this theorem. They also include additional plots from
simulations in Section 5.1 and Section 5.2 when  =∞, and in Section 5.3 when the maximum
of the matching probabilities is taken over (M,a) for fixed values of . Finally, the include the
p-values and signs for the coefficients in the two examples considered in Section 6.
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Figure 3: Values of Lsigt, (M,a, ) associated with T¯ t, for significance at different combinations
of (M,a, ) with α = 0.05, and λ0 = 0.2. Left and right panels show the results for Scenario
I and II, respectively. For Scenario I, each cell represents the average of 100,000 runs at that
(M,a). For Scenario II, each (M,a) cell comprises a 5 × 5 array of sub-cells representing the
results for the 25 coefficients in the CPS regression. Individual sub-cell results are averages of
1,000 runs. Within any cell or sub-cell, black represents Lsigt, (M,a, ) = 0 and white represents
Lsigt, (M,a, ) ≥ 0.25, with lighter grays as the loss function approaches 0.25.
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Figure 4: Values of Lsgnt, (M,a, ) at different combinations of (M,a, ) with α0 = 0.95. Left
and right panels show the results for Scenario I and II, respectively. For Scenario I, each cell rep-
resents the average of 100,000 runs at that (M,a). For Scenario II, each (M,a) cell comprises
a 5× 5 array of sub-cells representing the results for the 25 coefficients in the CPS regression.
Individual sub-cell results are averages of 1,000 runs. Within any cell or sub-cell, black repre-
sents Lsgnt, (M,a, ) = 0 and white represents L
sgn
t, (M,a, ) ≥ 0.25, with lighter grays as the
loss function approaches 0.25.
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Figure 5: Values of msigt, (µT , ) and m
sgn
t, (µT , ) at different combinations of µT and  with
α = 0.05. Left and right panels show Scenario I and II, respectively. Top and bottom panels
show the results for msigt, (µT , ) and m
sgn
t, (µT , ), respectively. For Scenario II, each point
presents µT and the minimum value of m
sig
k (µT , ) taken over the 25 regression coefficients.
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